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INTRODUCTION

The debate over whether legal rules should be used to redistribute
resources in society or whether redistribution should be left exclusively to
the tax-and-transfer system has long occupied philosophers, 1 political
3
2
4
theorists, economists, and legal academicians. For many years, the
conventional wisdom on this question among legal scholars seemed to be
that blanket generalizations were inappropriate. All systems of redistribution
distort individuals' choices and entail administrative costs. Therefore, the
argument went, a universal preference for using the tax-and-transfer system
to redistribute is not justified. Rather, the choice among institutions to
accomplish society's redistributive goals was considered to be "an empirical
one which must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, in the light of detailed
information about the circumstances likely to influence the effectiveness of
5
each method of redistribution."
At some point, however, a contrary view developed among economists,
a view that has become the new conventional wisdom: that income (or
wealth) redistribution is always better accomplished through the tax-and
6
transfer system than through the legal system. One of the arguments
traditionally offered to support this view is that redistribution through the
legal system is by nature more haphazard (in the sense of less

1. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 274-80 (1971). Rawls supports a division of
labor between what he calls "the basic structure of society" (which includes in particular the tax
and-transfer system) and the rules that apply to particular transactions (which would include
the legal system). Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive justice, 89 YALE LJ. 472,
500 (1979-80).
2. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 274-80; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 276-312
(1986) (arguing that the concern of other people's well-being is the responsibility of the
government and not of the citizens in their daily transactions utilizing private property).
3.

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 110-13 (3d ed. 2000).

4.
See generally Jennifer Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413
(1992); Thomas Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The &/,e of Income
Redistribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995).
5. See Kronman, supra note l, at 508. Others who have expressed similar views include
Guido Calabresi, The Point/,essness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE LJ. 1211, 1224-25
(1991), and Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 617
(1982). Some scholars have also opposed redistributive legal rules on the grounds that judges
are not competent to make redistributive determinations (whereas the taxing authority is) and
that non-redistributive legal rules are more "neutral" and less restrictive of individual liberty.
For a response to these arguments, see Kronman, supra note 1, at 501--06.
6. See, e.g. , A. M ITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 124-27
(2d ed. 1989); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell,

Efficiency in Redistribution] .
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comprehensive and less precise) than redistribution through the tax system. 7
That is, the tax system can redistribute from all better-off to all worse-off
individuals, whereas the legal system can redistribute only from those better
off to those worse off who are subject to the legal rule in question. In
addition, it was often argued that the legal system's capacity for income
redistribution is, in any event, small because redistributive legal rules will be
effective only in settings in which the parties are not able to "contract
8
around" the redistributive effect of those rules. Thus, the argument goes,
legal rules can perform a meaningful redistributive function only in
situations involving non-contract-based rules, such as tort rules governing
the conduct of strangers ( that is, individuals not in a contractual
relationship with one another) .9 In general, with some significant
qualifications, we agree that the haphazardness and contracting-around
arguments provide a basis for generally preferring the tax-and-transfer
10
system as the primary means of reducing income inequality.
What is important for this Article, however, is that the debate did not
end there. In the mid-1990s, in what has come to be considered a classic
article, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell made what seemed to be a decisive
11
argument regarding the use of redistributive legal rules. They argued that
income redistribution is always more efficiently accomplished through the
tax-and-transfer system, even if the contracting-around and haphazardness
12
issues are placed aside. The Kaplow and Shavell argument consists of
several steps. First, they note that any tax on income will distort work
incentives, in the sense that individuals subject to an income tax will tend to
13
work less than they would in a no-tax world. Next, they assert that the work
distortion would occur to precisely the same degree whether the new
income tax is imposed directly through the tax-and-transfer regime or

7. POLINSKY, supra note 6, at 125-27; Kaplow & Shaven, Ef
f iciency in Redistribution, supra
note 6, at 674-75; Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1051-56 (2001) [hereinafter Sanchirico, New Efficiency Rationale] .
8.
POLINSKY, supra note 6, at 123; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Fairness Versus Welfare,
114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1126 (2001 ).
9.

supra note 6, at 123.
See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules,
and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 177-78 (2003).
See Kaplow & Shaven, Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 667.
11.
Id. at 667-68. This argument was first developed in Steven Shaven, A Note on Efficiency
12.
vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given optimal
Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981). Shavell's early work on this topic drew from].
A. Mirrlees, optimal Tax Theory, 6 ]. PUB. ECON. 327 (1976). For Kaplow and Shaven's most
POLINSKY,

10.

recent reiteration of their efficiency argument favoring the tax-and-transfer system, see Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29]. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shaven,

Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?].
13.
Kaplow & Shaven, Ef
f iciency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 667-68.
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Finally, they argue that if a legal rule

were made "income dependent" (that is, the rule is designed to diverge
from efficiency in order to implement society's redistributive goals), not
only would there be the normal work-leisure distortion associated with any
equivalent income

tax, but there would also be a distortion in the

underlying activity being regulated by the legal rule.

15

For example, if tort

law were adjusted so that high-income tort defendants would always pay an
extra "tort tax" that poor tort defendants did not have to pay, high-income
potential tortfeasors would

both

reduce their work effort by precisely the

same amount as they would under a direct income tax (where the legal rule
was set to achieve efficiency, holding the amount of revenue collected
constant)

would take excessive levels of care (owing to the rule's

and

inefficiency).
In their more formal analysis, Kaplow and Shavell demonstrate that
under certain assumptions, it is possible, with respect to any income
dependent legal rule, to design a "simple alternative" legal regime that is
16
in which all redistribution is accomplished

independent of income

through the tax-and-transfer system,

and which leaves

everyone as well off as

under the income-dependent rule. In addition, this regime would produce
17
more revenue for the government.
This line of argument produces a
powerful

conclusion:

as

a

matter of

theory,

redistribution-even a single dollar-would

14.

Kaplow & Shavell,

any
always

amount of

income

be more efficiently

Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 667-68 ("[U]sing legal

rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much as the income tax system
because the distortion is caused by the redistribution itself-and also creates inefficiencies in
the activities regulated by the legal rules.").Kaplow and Shavell note:
[I]f legal rules disadvantage

high-income

individuals

and help low-income

individuals, that will tend to discourage work effort in the same manner and to the
same extent as making the income tax system more redistributive.Whether it is the
tax collector or the courts that take an additional 1 percent of rich people's
income and give it to the poor, the reward for work by the rich is reduced by 1
percent, so the distortion of work effort will be the same.
Kaplow & Shavell,

15.

Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 12, at 823.
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 12, at 823-24 ("[W]hen

Kaplow & Shavell,

inefficient legal rules are employed to redistribute income, there is not only a distortion of work
effort; there is also the cost directly associated with the inefficiency of the legal rule (such as
insufficient or excessive precaution in to avoid accidents).").

16.
17.

Id. at 822.
Kaplow and Shavell argue that:
The conclusion is that adopting the efficient legal rule, with an appropriate
change in the income tax, leaves all individuals equally well off but leaves the
government with a surplus. With this additional revenue, the government can
make each individual better off-for example, by lowering taxes . .. by a fixed
amount for each individual or spending the funds on a public good that benefits
everyone.

Kaplow & ShaveII,

Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 674 (footnote omitted).
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accomplished through the tax system than through the legal system. This is
sometimes referred to as the "double-distortion" argument because of the
idea that whereas a redistributive tax system produces only one distortion
(the distortion of labor decisions), a redistributive legal rule would produce
two distortions: the labor distortion and the distortion of the conduct
regulated by the legal rule, such as accident avoidance in the case of tort
18
law.
This Article elucidates the extent to which this argument is based on
implausible assumptions. The Article accomplishes this by first relaxing
Kaplow and Shavell's assumption of homogeneity across victims and injurers
(or across taxpayers); that is, it introduces the possibility of heterogeneity
within the population with regard to skill in "taking care" to avoid accidents

and

with

regard

to

ability

to

generate

income. Second,

and

more

importantly, we relax the assumption on which Kaplow and Shavell critically
rely, that the social planner-the one seeking both to deter accidents and
redistribute income-has complete information.
We are not the first scholars to point out the importance of the
homogeneity assumption to Kaplow and Shavell's analysis. Professor Chris
Sanchirico did it before us, and Kaplow and Shavell have defended their
19
notwithstanding this critique.
We find it important,

conclusion

nevertheless, to discuss heterogeneity for several reasons. First, this Article
presents the idea in a way that is accessible to legal economists with no
formal background in economics. Second, it presents a more complete
picture of the ex ante adjustments that will be made by individuals (differing
both in their care-taking skill and their ability to generate income) when
they face an income-dependent legal regime. These ex ante adjustments are

1 8. As Kaplow and Shavell put it, "even though the income tax distorts work incentives,
any regime with an inefficient legal rule can be replaced by a regime with an efficient legal rule
and a modified income tax system designed so that every person is made better off." Kaplow &
Shavell, Ef
f iciency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 669. Our main point ultimately is that Kaplow
and Shavell's double-<l.istortion argument explicitly assumes away differential administrative
costs. They even contend that redistributive legal rules are probably more costly to administer
than the alternative. Id. at 674 n.12. It is our sense that Kaplow and Shavell's basic double
distortion argument has become the new conventional wisdom with respect to the use of
redistributive legal rules. It also should be noted, however, that Kaplow and Shavell discuss
other arguments against the use of redistributive legal rules, such as the haphazardness
problem and the contracting-around problem, discussed in the text above. In a separate article,
two of us provide a fuller account of, as well as a number of responses to, those problems. See
Logue & Avraham, supra note I O. In this Article, however, we focus exclusively on the validity of
Kaplow and Shavell's core efficiency argument, which does not depend on either the
haphazardness or the contracting-around arguments.
19. In two recent papers Professor Sanchirico launches his own attack on Kaplow and
Shavell's double-<l.istortion argument. See generally Sanchirico, New Efficiency Rationale, supra note
7; Chris Sanchirico, Taxes Ve1:ms Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000 ) . In both of these articles, Sanchirico discusses the importance of
Kaplow and Shavell's assumption of homogeneity. For Kaplow and Shavell's response, see
Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 12, at 822-35.
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not salient in Kaplow and Shavell's analysis-a fact that has caused
confusion. Third, highlighting the heterogeneity observation as well as the
ex ante-adjustments observation allows this Article to make its most
important point: under Kaplow and Shavell's modified tax-and-transfer
regime, the policy maker would face an enormous informational burden.
The main claim of this Article, simply put, is that in light of the
heterogeneity of individuals and in light of their ex ante behavioral
adjustments, Kaplow and Shavell's theoretical model of a tax-and-transfer
alternative to redistributive legal rules is no longer simple. To the contrary,
20
it is virtually impossible to implement.
As argued at length below, under an income-dependent tort rule,
wealthy potential tortfeasors can reduce their overall tort liability either by
changing their work effort, by changing their engagement in the regulated
activity (such as by decreasing or increasing their level of care) , or, most
likely, by doing some of both (adjusting both their work effort and the
regulated activity) . Thus, in a sense, the income-dependent tort rule gives
wealthy potential tortfeasors two degrees of freedom, whereas the income
independent regime gives them only one. This Article argues that, given
individuals' different care-taking skills and abilities to generate income, with
the introduction of an income-dependent tort regime, there is no simple
way to determine the amount of work and the amount of care-level
investments for every individual. For example, Kaplow and Shavell argue
that an income-dependent tort rule, which sets "damages higher when the
injurer is wealthy and lower when the injurer is poor[,] . . . would induce the
21
wealthy to take more care and the poor to take less care than is efficient. "
In contrast, this Article demonstrates that when making the ex ante
adjustment explicit, one might well conclude that rich injurers might still
take insufficient care.
Kaplow and Shavell would presumably respond that whatever
combination of changes in work activity and care-level investments occurred,
it would still be possible to construct a tax-and-transfer regime (along with
an efficient, income-independent tort rule) that would leave everyone at

20.

In one of his arguments critiquing Kaplow and Shavell's thesis, Sanchirico makes an

argument that comes close

to

ours. He seems to criticize Kaplow and Shavell for ignoring

See Sanchirico, New
Efficiency Rationale, supra note 7, at 1073 ("As is appropriate in calculating these 'before-versus
after' gains and losses, after means not only after the rule change but also after individuals'

individuals' adjustments in both their work and precautionary efforts.

consequent behavioral adjustments."). However, it is not clear what Sanchirico makes out of
this observation. He mentions it in passing to support another of his critiques of the double
distortion argument. Our analysis, in contrast, shows precisely how the behavior of the potential
injurer will change under an income.<fependent tort regime. In addition, Sanchirico does not
discuss the high informational burden Kaplow and Shavell's alternative regime would impose
on the taxing authority. We provide a detailed account of this critical informational burden in
this Article and explain why it undermines the strongest version of the double.<fistortion point.

21.

Kaplow & Shavell,

Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 669.
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least as well off and would save resources for the efficient tort rule in its
place. However, there are only two ways of constructing such a regime,
neither of which provides a satisfactory answer. First, it would be possible to
construct a general tax-and-transfer regime, a regime that applies the same
tax function to all people at the same level of income. Such a regime,
however, would be a Pareto superior regime only if we assume that all
individuals are identical in every way except for differences in income-that
is, only if all individuals are homogeneous. Even then, however, as this
Article demonstrates below, the amount of information needed to construct
such a Pareto superior regime is prohibitively large. In any case, once the fact
that individuals are heterogeneous at given levels of income is taken into
account, Kaplow and Shavell's results do not apply. And individuals almost
certainly are heterogeneous at given levels of income both in their ability to
generate income and in their skill in taking care. For example, individuals at
a given level of income have different capacities for avoiding accidents and
have different work/leisure tradeoffs. Thus, under Kaplow and Shavell's
model, it becomes impossible to construct a general Pareto superior tax-and
22
transfer regime that leaves everyone as well off and saves resources.
There is a second way, however, of constructing a Pareto superior tax-and
transfer regime. Under the assumption of heterogeneous individuals within
income groups, it would be possible in theory to construct a regime that has
a tailored tax function for each individual. As this Article establishes below,
however, such a regime would require the policymaker (in particular, the
taxing authority) to have an enormous amount of information about each
taxpayer. To take the tort tax example again, the taxing authority would
need to know not only each individual's income level but also how much she
has invested in accident avoidance, how much harm she has caused, and
how accident-prone she is. Thus, this Article argues that what Kaplow and
Shavell call a "simple alternative" is in practice (especially once their
simplifying assumptions are relaxed) impossible to implement. It is
disadvantageous not because of political impediments to modifying the tax

22. In their debate, both Kaplow and Shavell on the one hand and Sanchirico on the
other seem to focus only on the issue of heterogeneity in care-taking skills. Kaplow & Shavell,
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 1 2, at 827-32. Remarkably, Kaplow and Shavell in a
footnote explicitly admit that "in practice" their alternative Pareto superior regime is not Pareto
superior at all. Specifically, they argue that "[i] n practice, redistribution through the income tax
rather than through legal rules would not literally make everyone better off. Inevitably, some
would gain more than others and a few might lose." Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in Redistribution,
supra note 6, at 674 n.7. Nevertheless, they go on to argue that "[f]or reasons noted in Section
Il(a) one might expect legal rules to fare worse" than tax rules. Id. A glance at Section II(a)
reveals that the main reasons are the contracting-around and the haphazardness arguments. Id.
at 674-76. As we explained at length elsewhere, we largely agree that the haphazardness and
the contracting-around arguments, though not the double-distortion argument, can serve as the
basis for generally preferring the tax system over legal rules as the main (though perhaps not
the sole) system for income redistribution. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 10, at 173-201 .
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23
24
code, or because of individuals' behavioral quirks, as some have argued,
but rather because of the informational burden it imposes on the taxing
25
authority.
Part I presents a number of graphs that compare the income-dependent
with the income-independent legal regimes, and it highlights the exact ex
ante adjustments that individuals will make once faced with taxation,
whether a tort tax or income tax. Part II uses the graphs presented in Part I
to reveal the informational burden the social planner faces when designing
an alternative tax regime that meets Kaplow and Shavell's standards. Part III
responds to possible objections to our argument, and Part IV concludes.
I.

THE INCOME-DEPENDENT TORT REGIME
A.

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this analysis, again, is to compare the overall efficiency
of two types of regimes: a regime in which legal rules are income independent
(in which all redistribution, if any, is accomplished through the tax-and
transfer system) ; and a regime in which legal rules are income dependent (set
to redistribute from the rich to the poor) . In keeping with the recent
literature on redistributive legal rules, this Article makes this comparison
26
using the example of tort rules coupled with an income tax. To make the
analysis manageable, we make a series of simplifying assumptions about
individual taxpayers' tort characteristics and about accidents in general.
These assumptions are borrowed from standard efficiency analyses of

23.

See Logue & Avraham, supra note 1 0, at 252-57.

24. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1653, 1656 ( 1 998) .
25.

This fact is well known in the economics literature from which Kaplow and Shavell's

analysis is drawn. For example, Mirrlees notes that "[t]here is no way of obtaining the
information about individuals that is required [for making perfectly tailored transfers] except
in a society of individuals who are truthful regardless of selfish considerations." J. A. Mirrlees,

The optimal Taxation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1197, 1 1 98 ( 1986).
26.

In keeping with the literature on this subject, we focus on case-specific and not class

based redistributive rules. For an analysis of that distinction, see Logue & Avraham,

supra note

1 0, at 182-83. It is somewhat difficult to determine precisely what Kaplow and Shavell's position
is on the choice between class-based and case-specific redistributive rules. On the one hand,
when they discuss the issue in general, they seem to deal with class-based redistributive rules.
Yet in their "analysis" section, they use rules that are case-specific, in that each individual subject
to the rule is supposed to pay (or receive) tort damages in accordance with the difference
between his and some arbitrary cutoff income. Kaplow & Shavell,

Efficiency in Redistribution,
supra note 6, at 677. Sanchirico, too, is somewhat hard to pin down on this point. In one place
he seems to endorse case-specific redistributive rules. In his view, "specific conditioning [of the
redistributive legal rules] on the observable economic attributes of the particular parties before

New Efficiency Rationale, supra note 7, at
1 01 1 . Elsewhere, however, he suggests that class-based rules are what he has in mind. Id. at
1 027-28.

the court is actually welfare-improving." Sanchirico,
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27
liability rules. First, taxpayers are divided into potential lllJUrers and
potential victims, assuming that injurers can never be victims, and vice versa.
We also assume that all accidents are "unilateral" in the sense that victims
can do nothing to affect accident costs, that all accidents are of fixed severity
(so that a potential iajurer's level of precautions can affect only an
accident's probability) , and that the probability of accidents is affected only
by injurers' care-level investments (and not by changes in activity levels ) . In
addition, a rule of strict liability is assumed. As is conventional in the
literature on optimal taxation, this Article assumes that the government can
observe only the general distributions of ability to generate income and of
skill in taking care to avoid accidents; therefore, it assumes that the
government cannot observe these characteristics on an individual, person. 28
by-person, bas1s.
We begin our analysis a moment before the tort tax is imposed. Thus,
assume that all tort rules are initially income-independent-that is, they are
set only to achieve optimal injurer precautions. Under an income
independent tort regime, the tradeoff between labor and leisure is entirely
independent of the legal rule chosen. In such a world, if there were no
income tax, the individual would make work decisions that maximize her
money plus psychic (leisure) income. However, when an income tax is
added to this picture (which, by definition, is independent of the tort
regime) , individuals will have an incentive to substitute away from work and
29
towards leisure. This is the standard work-leisure distortion that economists
associate with the introduction of an income tax. These observations are
illustrated in the following charts.

27. These are "homogenizing" assumptions. Abandoning them would not affect our
conclusions; it wouldjust make their demonstration more complex.
28.
See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 1 2 , at 41 4-15 (making the same assumption) . By obsetving
just the general distributions of these characteristics, the government is able to design only
general tax schemes to be implemented by either the IRS or by the courts. See infra text
following note 53 for details.
29. In keeping with Kaplow and Shavell's analysis, we do not consider the possibility of
abolishing the income tax altogether, but consider instead only the question of whether to
supplement the income tax with redistributive legal rules on the margin.
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Charts la & lb: The Potential Inj urer's Choices Under an
Income-Independent Tort Regime
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Chart la illustrates a potential injurer's work/leisure choices under an
income-independent tort regime. We initially assume a flat tax on money
income. The line denoted W(e) represents the individual's money income
(after the flat tax) as a function of her work effort measured in hours.
Obviously, as work effort increases, income increases. The line in Chart la
denoted L(e) represents the individual's psychic (or leisure) income as a
function of her leisure hours. Thus, under this model, the potential injurer
can spend her time in two types of activities: work or the catch-all category,
30
leisure. Thus, the more she works, the less time there is for leisure. The
line denoted I(E) is the individual's total income: the sum of her money
income and psychic (leisure) income. When choosing between work and
leisure, therefore, the individual will seek to maximize her total income.
This maximization problem is commonly called the work-leisure tradeoff. In
Chart la, the point of maximization is denoted by E*.
Chart lb shows the same individual's safety choices with respect to the
"regulated activity" in question; that is, the activity in which the individual
may cause harm for which she is then held liable in tort. Again, we assume
here a rule of strict liability, such that all injurers will be held liable for the
full costs of any harm that they cause to third parties. The line denoted X
represents the costs of accident avoidance (or safety costs) incurred by the
potential injurer as a function of the amount of precaution she takes. The
idea, put simply, is that precautions cost money; thus, the upward slope
implies only that increasing amounts of investments in precaution require
increasing amounts of sacrifice (assumed to be at a constant rate). The line
denoted D(x) represents the expected damages to third parties that the
potential injurer expects to be liable for at any given level of precaution
taken. In sum, the more precaution she takes, the more she spends on
accident avoidance (X slopes upward). However, as she spends more on
accident avoidance, the lower her expected tort damage (D(x) slopes
31
downward). The line denoted C(X,H4) is, therefore, the total cost of

30. For simplicity, following Kaplow and Shavell's approach, we assume, somewhat
unrealistically, that the income function is linear with respect to work effort and that the tax is
proportional or flat. Observe that W(e) does not start from the origin. This is because some
people-the unemployed, for example-receive money income even when they do not work.
Our psychic income curve, however, is not linear. We make this adj ustment to avoid the
following problem. If both the work income and the psychic income curves are assumed to be
linear, the individual will end up in a comer solution, choosing to spend either all her twenty
four hours working or all of them in leisure, depending on which activity gives her the higher
(constant) marginal utility. But see Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in &distribution, supra note 6, at
677 (applying linear work and psychic income functions) .
31. The shape of the D (x) curve assumes diminishing marginal damages per unit of
precautions taken. Stated more technically, the expected harm function is convex, representing
the fact that the probability of accidents, P(X) , is indeed a decreasing function of the level of
precautions taken, yet in a diminishing manner. (P'<O, P">O) . This assumption is standard in
the deterrence literature. See, e.g. , STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 3436 ( 1 987).
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accidents, with each point on the curve representing, for that level of
precaution as well as for the fixed harm arbitrarily denoted H4 the sum of
32
the costs-of-precaution and the expected damages paid to third parties. If
we ignore the work-leisure tradeoff for now on the current assumption that
tort rules are independent of income, the individual will seek to minimize
her total cost of accidents. Thus, there is a precautions-harm tradeoff that is
analogous to the work-leisure tradeoff. On Chart lb, that minimization
point is denoted X*.
To summarize, moments before the tort tax is introduced, still under an
income-independent tort regime, the potential injurer is assumed to make
two independent choices: how many hours to work, and how many safety
precautions to take. Presumably, under the current assumptions, she would
choose E* and X*.
Next, consider what happens if the policymaker decides to achieve an
additional amount of redistribution, not through the tax system, but
through the legal system. Specifically, imagine that the policymaker chooses
to adopt an income-dependent tort regime. Again, we are assuming, for
simplicity, that the tort regime in effect is a strict-liability regime, under
which injurers are required to pay damages for all harm caused to third
parties. Recall that under the income-independent tort regime, such a rule
gives potential injurers the incentive to invest efficiently (from a societal
perspective) in accident precautions. Now, under an income-dependent
strict-liability regime, the tort damages that an injurer must pay are made a
function of the injurer's income level. For example, a wealthy tort defendant
who is found to have caused an injury to some third party would be required
to pay tort damages in excess of the harm caused. In contrast, a poor, but
33
liable, tort defendant would be allowed to pay less than the harm caused.
32.
H4.

For reasons that will be clear below, we arbitrarily denote the fixed level of harm to be

33.
As in Kaplow and Shavell's model, our hypothetical tort tax is a function of the
difference between the tortfeasor's income and some arbitrary cutoff income. To demonstrate
the complexity of taking into account ex ante adjustments to the legal rules, we implement a
simple "tort tax" that is equal to 1 % of the difference between the tortfeasor's income and an
arbitrary cutoff income of $30,000. Thus, tortfeasors who earn $ 1 00,000 will, if they are held
liable, pay a positive tort tax of $700, whereas those who earn $0 will pay a negative tort tax (i.e.
receive a transfer) of $300, with a linear relationship for intermediate incomes. Kaplow and
Shavell demonstrated the consequences of collecting and redistributing some function of the
difference between individual income and a cutoff income of $33,333, also in the range of
incomes $0 to $ 100,000. Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 669-71 .
However, Kaplow and Shavell assumed that after individuals made their adjustments to the legal
rule-both in their work-leisure decision and in their care level decisions-the redistributional
scheme would be linear. What is hidden in the Kaplow and Shavell analysis is the complex tax
function needed to get the linear ex ante adjustments scheme. Id. Our Appendix demonstrates
how we modeled the tort tax. The way we chose to model the tort tax, as well as the choice of
numbers, is arbitrary and does not influence the qualitative results of our paper. Thus, our tort
tax model is, in principle, identical to the model used by Kaplow and Shavell with one major
difference: no hidden steps.
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The general thrust of Kaplow and Shavell's argument is that
redistributing through a legal rule (or making the legal rule income
dependent) is less efficient than redistributing precisely the same amount
directly through the tax system (and keeping legal rules income
independent) . This is because the former produces two non-offsetting
distortions ( the work-leisure distortion plus the regulated-activity distortion) ,
whereas the latter produces only one distortion ( the work-leisure
34
distortion) . Charts 2a and 2b are the first steps in our explanation of how
individuals would respond to an income-dependent tort regime.
Charts 2a & 2b: Individuals' Choices in the Income-Dependent World
(The Double-Distortion Argument)
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For a short reference to the non-offsetting distortions issue, see Kaplow & Shavell,

Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 12, at 824 n.5.
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Chart 2b

X*

X**

Precautions

Chart 2a shows the potential injurer's work-leisure choices under the
income-dependent, strict liability tort regime. Curve I ( e ) , the total income
curve, was copied directly from Chart la above, on the assumption that the
income tax has not changed. Chart 2b is somewhat different than Chart 1b
above, however. Chart 2b presents a map of all the possible total-accident-cost
functions (the C curves) , which are functions that include precaution costs
plus expected damages paid to third parties at each level of precaution
taken (represented by X), all as a function of the different levels of fixed
harms HO to HS. One way to understand this map of total-accident-cost
functions is to imagine that each cost function (each line on the chart)
corresponds to a different type of risk and that each risk has a different
35
potential maximum (fixed) harm.
Under the previous income
independent tort regime, we arbitrarily assumed that the fix harm was H4;
here we show the cost functions, C, for both smaller ( HO to H3) and larger
(HS) harms.
Notice that total-accident-cost curves HO through HS entail widely
different total accident costs at low or zero levels of precaution
expenditures. Thus, if the individual expends no effort or money to prevent
accidents of any kind, there are a number of different types of risks that
might materialize, each with a different magnitude of fixed harm. Note,
35. Recall our assumption that the harm is fixed, and thus, precautions taken by a
potential tortfeasor can only influence the probability of accident. See supra text accompanying
notes 27-28.
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however, that as the individual increases her precaution expenditures, all of
the lines begin to converge. The intuition there is that as precaution
investments increase, the probability (and hence the expected value) of
damages paid to third parties decreases. Therefore, once the probability of
harm has fallen sufficiently low, the total-accident-cost curve for all types of
36
harms will be solely a function of the precaution expenses.
Now we can start putting Kaplow and Shavell's double-distortion insight
into our framework. Recall that under an income-dependent tort regime, a
wealthy injurer's tort damages are set higher than the victim's loss in order
to introduce a redistributive component to the legal rule. The ex ante effect
of this adjustment from the wealthy potential injurer's perspective is that
conditioned on being involved in an accident, she now faces a higher total
37
accident-cost function.
For example, in Chart 2b above, when a
redistributive legal rule is introduced, the potential injurer no longer faces
the total-accident-cost function represented by curve H4; rather, she now
faces H5. As a result, the potential injurer will no longer choose X*, which
corresponded to the total-accident-cost minimizing point prior to the rule
change, C*4, when the relevant curve was H4. She will instead choose a
higher level of precautions, perhaps X**, corresponding to the new cost
38
minimizing point, C*5, on the new total-accident-cost curve, H5.
It is important to observe that this is not the end of the story, as our
next section explains.
B.

MAKING THE EX ANTE ADJUSTMENTS EXPLJCIT AND
INTRODUCING HETEROGENEITY

This section offers a description of how one would expect a potential
injurer to adjust ex ante to the introduction of such a rule. We argue that in
order to minimize her overall total-accident-cost function (which, under an
income-dependent tort regime, is now a function of her after-tax income, as
well as her precaution costs and residual expected harm), the potential
injurer would make ex ante adjustments along both the work-leisure
dimension and the precaution-cost dimension. In particular, we

One might wonder why, for some types of risk, the total-accident-cost curve is a
36.
straight line even at low levels of precaution. See line HO in the chart. This line merely
represents a type of risk (which if materialize causes a fixed harm of zero) for which the optimal
care level is zero. Indeed, as can be seen in the chart, the total cost minimizing point for HO is
the origin.
37. The same type of an analysis would apply to a poor potential injurer who would now
face a lower total-accident-cost function.
38. The higher total-accident-cost curve the potential injurer faces under the income
dependent tort regime is the point of divergence between the private problem the injurer faces
(minimizing her total private expenditures) and the social problem the social planner faces
(minimizing the total social accident costs ) . Indeed, as Kaplow and Shavell argue, choosing X**
is, despite being privately optimal, socially inefficient. The socially optimal level of care, the one
that minimizes total social costs, is still X*, as it was before.
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demonstrate that the potential injurer may indeed (as the Kaplow and
Shavell paradigmatic example assumes) take more than the efficient level of
care (greater than X*), but that she may also take insufficient care (less than
X*). Chart 3 is the first step in this explanation.
Chart 3: The Privately Optimal Accident Costs, C*, as a
Function of Harm Faced by the Injurer
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Chart 3, which is derived from Chart 2b, depicts a curve that consists of
all of the potential injurer's total-accident-cost minimizing points for all of
the various potential harms threatened. Thus, the values C*4 and C*5,
which were copied from chart 2b, represent the total-accident-cost
minimizing values for the total-accident-cost functions C4 and C5,
39
respectively. Next, to be able to see how the accident-cost-minimizing
decision will interact with the work-leisure decision, we need to superimpose
Chart 3 of total-accident-cost minimizing points onto the graph of the work-

39. Note the change of axes. To understand why this curve has this particular curvature,
first notice that, for an extremely low level of harm, say HO, the optimal level of care is indeed
zero. See supra note 30. Second, observe that the graph is concave, representing the facts that
(a) the higher the level of maximum harm threatened, the higher the optimal level of accident
costs, C*; and (b) the optimal level of costs increases in a diminishing way with harm. That this
function is concave can be proved more formally by the envelope theorem.
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leisure tradeoff shown in Chart 2a above. Unfortunately, these two graphs
(the total-accident-cost minimizing points and the work-leisure tradeofl)
have different X-axes: harm faced by injurer (in dollars) and work effort (in
hours), respectively. As a result, two transformations to Chart 3 above are
required in order to be able to present them together. In the Appendix, we
show the transformations needed to get to Chart 5 below. Thus, Chart 5
presents the work-leisure and the accident-cost-minimizing decisions a
potential tortfeasor faces ex ante under the income-dependent tort regime.
Chart 5: The Total-Accident-Cost Minimizing Points and the
Optimal Work-Leisure Tradeoff, as a Function Of Effort 40

Chart 5
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Chart 5 is composed of two curves. As before, line l(e), taken from
Chart la above, is the total after-tax money income plus psychic income
before the policy maker imposes the new income tax. Line C*(e) is the
collection of total-accident-cost minimizing points as a function of effort.
This curve is copied from Chart 4b in the Appendix and represents the
privately optimal accident costs under the income-dependent tort regime. It
is a transformation of the total-accident-cost minimizing points, C* from
Chart 3 above, to a representation that is a function of work effort rather

40. Chart 5 assumes that E* is to the right of C*4. This need not necessarily be the case.
We will comment in the following footnotes how the analysis changes when E* is to the left of
C*4.
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1
than of harm.4 What Chart 5 demonstrates is the more complicated set of
ex ante optimization decisions that the potential injurer faces. Specifically,
the potential iajurer will, under this model, choose a level of work effort and
accident precautions that maximizes the difference between her after-tax
money income and psychic income on the one side and accident costs on
the other. This individually optimal solution for the potential injurer will
occur at a level of work effort and accident precautions that maximizes the
vertical distance between I(e) and C*(e) in Chart 5.
To see how this process might work, consider how the various ex ante
incentives might interact with each other. Imagine first that the potential
injurer starts at point E*, taken from Chart la above. At this point, her work
leisure tradeoff would have been optimized just before the introduction of
the new tort tax (that is, just before the tort rule was made income
dependent, her total after tax income, including psychic income, would
have been I(E*)). Recall that her socially optimal level of precautions was at
C*4, corresponding to the H4 level of fixed harm that we arbitrarily assumed
under the income-independent tort regime.
Now we demonstrate what happens when an income-dependent tort tax
is introduced. For methodological reasons we first assume that when the new
tort tax is introduced, the potential injurer cannot change her work effort.
In that case, the potential tortfeasor would have an incentive to increase her
accident-prevention investments, moving to point C*(E*) in Chart 5.42 At
that temporary point, her net gain would be equal to the vertical distance
between A and D.
The potential iajurer, however, would not stay at that point for long.
Relaxing now the assumption that she cannot change her work effort, we
observe that the potential injurer, knowing the relationship between work
effort and total-accident-costs, would also reduce her work effort in order to
reduce her income-dependent tort liability. Specifically, she would
presumably settle on the level of work effort plus accident precautions that
would also maximize her total after-tax money income, plus psychic income,
'
minus her accident costs. Put differently, the potential tortfeasor realizes
that if she reduces her work effort, it would also reduce her tort liability,
moving her simultaneously to the left on curves C*(e) and I(e). The

41. The reader might wonder why C*(e) looks flatter when depicted in Chart 5 than when
it was depicted in Chart 4b in the Appendix. The reason lies in the different scales of the two
charts. Recall that Chart 4b depicts changes ranging from a negative income tax of $300 (to
those who earn $0) to a positive income tax of $700 (from those who earn $1 00,000). When
compared to the possible annual incomes, which can be more than ten times larger in
magnitude, the C*(e) curve looks flat. Again, C*(e) is exactly copied from Chart 4(b), but
normalized for a different scale; thus it looks flat, but is not really so.
42. Recall that in our model the tort tax is represented by the injurer facing a larger than
the H4 level of fixed harm. That move, of course, can be thought of as part of the double
distortion that Kaplow and Shavell complain of: the "overinvestment" in accident precautions.
See supra note 1 5 and accompanying text.
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intuition behind this result is that the more the individual reduces her after
money income by working less, the less will be her incentive to invest (or
overinvest) in safety, because less income is at stake. This is why working less
hours causes both white stars at Chart 5 to move left together.
The main issue is whether by working less than E*, the potential injurer
gains more by having less tort-related expenditures than she loses by having
less total net income. The answer is always yes. To see this point, observe that
when we start to move to the left along the total income curve, I (e), the
individual makes less net total income. However, as is true at the optimum
E*, the slope remains, by definition, zero. Thus, at least for the first
infinitesimal step, she does not lose any total income at all. In contrast, when
we make the same infinitesimal step to the left on the optimal accident costs
curve, C* (e) , because the slope is always positive, the iajurer necessarily
incurs less tort-related expenditures. Again, under the income-dependent
tort regime, the two white stars move left together because working fewer
hours causes the potential tortfeasor to earn less income. Since less income
is at stake, however, there is an incentive to take fewer precautions. Thus,
when the injurer works less she gains more than she loses, at least for the
first infinitesimal step. This "slopes advantage" remains up to the point
where both curves have the same slopes, at which point the individual
should stop reducing her amount of work. Continuing to reduce the
amount of work will make her lose more in total net income than she earns
by having to pay lower tort costs.
In Chart 5 the gain-maximizing point is represented by the two black
stars, and the net gain is represented by the vertical distance BE (which is
larger than the vertical distance AD) . In general, however, the point where
the slopes of both curves are equal (which is the point where the individual
will stop reducing her work effort) could fall anywhere to the left of E*.
Our analysis differs from that of Kaplow and Shavell's paradigmatic
example in the following way: according to our analysis, under the income
dependent tort regime, the point where both curves' slopes are equal
(which is the point where the individual will stop reducing her work effort)
could fall anywhere to the left of E*. Recall that Kaplow and Shavell argue
that under income-dependent tort regimes rich tortfeasors will take excessive
care. Our analysis, by contrast, shows that in general, different potential
tortfeasors will make choices that might fall to the left of C*4. This means
43
that they might take insufficient care rather than excessive care. More
tax

43. This result is not necessarily robust in more general models. As mentioned above,
Kaplow and Shavell seem generally to recognize the fact that people make ex ante adjustments.
They claim in passing that "when an individual with income contemplates earning additional
income by working harder, his total marginal expected payments equal the sum of his marginal
tax payment and the expected marginal cost on account of accidents." Kaplow & Shaven,
Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 671. They do not, however, explain why this statement
is true. It is interesting to observe that whenever the individual's ex ante adjustments make her
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importantly, as different individuals have different capacities to generate
income as well as different skill in taking care, different individuals will have
different ending points that maximize their total net gain.
II.

THE DESIGN OF AN ALTERNATIVE PARETO.IMPROVING TAX

The more general claim that Kaplow and Shavell make is that they can
replace any income-dependent legal rule with a modified income tax that
will make everyone better off. 44 In the previous Part we argued that Kaplow
and Shavell's analysis was not clear as to the exact way in which potential
tortfeasors would make their adjustments along the two margins. It follows,
then, that an untailored income tax regime may only coincidentally be
equivalent, for some potential tortfeasor, to the income-dependent tort
regime; yet for most potential tortfeasors, this will not be the case. Some
potential tortfeasors will work more and some will work less than others;
some will take excessive care and others insufficient care.
As we mentioned above, Kaplow and Shavell might also argue that it is
possible to construct an individually tailored tax rule that will make every
single individual indifferent between the two regimes. Although we agree
with this claim in theory, we argue that the informational burden imposed
on the tax-and-transfer system makes the claim impossible to implement.
The formidable informational burden is not salient in Kaplow and Shavell's
non-formal analysis for two distinct reasons. First, they assumed
homogeneity among individuals. Second, they did not fully develop the way
in which potential tortfeasors would make their ex ante adjustments, as we
did above. Notwithstanding Kaplow and Shavell's claim that their scheme is
45
"simple," we disagree. Charts 6a and 6b help present our point.
First, consider what happens if the policymaker decides to increase in
general the amount of income redistribution in the tax system. Under the
current assumption that the tort system is independent of income, such a
redistributive policy decision must be implemented through the tax system.
Thus, the income tax, which is still assumed to be flat, is made somewhat
greater. The result is that the individual now will expect to earn less money
for each hour worked prior to the new tax, and therefore, will tend to work
fall to the left of C*4, there is a potential that she would be better off than before (even before
the new tax: was imposed). Specifically, it well may be that BE (representing the net gain after
the potential tortfeasor made her adjustments towards the new tort tax:) will be larger than AF
(which represents the individual net income before the new tax was imposed at all). This does
not strike us as counterintuitive because this potential tortfeasor is a "winner" in this particular
example. After all, that is why we have a redistributive tax system: to make some people worse
off and others better off than before the tax: was imposed.

44.

See supra text accompanying notes 1 1-18.

45. Interestingly, the formal analysis in Kaplow and Shavell's Appendix, in contrast, makes
it very clear that the informational burden on the tax authorities is extraordinary (see their
equation A3 ) . Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 678. However, as far
as we can discern, this point has escaped academic scrutiny.
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less. This is the traditional work distortion associated with an income tax.
Chart 6a represents this substitution effect graphically.

46

Chart 6a: The Work Distortion Associated with the Income Tax in an
Income-Independent World

Chart 6a
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This chart shows the individual's work-leisure choices with the
introduction of the new income tax. Specifically, W' ( e) represents the new
after-tax work income, and the dotted line I' ( e) represents the sum of after
47
tax work income and psychic income. As Chart 6a shows, the individual will
choose to work fewer hours than she worked before; that is, she shifts from
E* to E'*. In sum, imposing a new tax on income in a world in which tort
rules and tort damages are income-independent induces a substitution away
from work and towards leisure, whereas there is no change in the
individual 's investment in accident precautions. The individual continues to
spend X* on accident precautions, since those costs are unrelated to after
tax income.
But Kaplow and Shavell do not simply argue that they can design a
general alternative tax rule. They argue that they can design a tax regime that
will leave the individual completely indifferent between the new tax regime

46. This work distortion is also called the substitution effect, as the individual is induced
by the change of relative prices between work and leisure to "substitute" toward leisure. Of
course, there can also be an income effect that cuts the other way; that is, in order to maintain a
given desired level of income, taxpayers may respond to an increased income tax by working
more. But that change in behavior is inherent in any type of tax, even a lump-sum tax, and
therefore is not considered distortionary. In any case, discussing income effects is beyond the
scope of this Article.
47. By "after-tax," we mean after the work-income tax has been collected. Thus, we assume
no tax on leisure or psychic income.
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and the income-independent regime, both in the number of hours they
choose to work and their net total income. The next chart presents the way
that the policy maker can design an income tax that would leave the
potential tortfeasor indifferent between this new tax regime and the income
dependent tort regime.
Chart 6b: The Design of an Alternative Pareto Improving Tax Regime

Chart 6b
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As before, line I(e) , taken from Chart 5 above, is the total of after-tax
money income plus psychic income before the policy maker imposes the new
income tax. Line C*(e) is the collection of total-accident-cost minimizing
points as a function of effort. This curve is also copied from Chart 5 above.
As our analysis in the previous Part demons trated, a potential tortfeasor

temporarily starts at point E*, but gravitates toward the point where the
vertical distance between her income curve, I ( e ) , and the accident cost
curve, C * (e) , is maximized. In the previous Part we argued that E** could be
anywhere, depending on the slopes of the two curves (the income curve,
I (e ) , and the accident cost curve, C* (e) ) . Without loss of generality we now
assume this maximizing point to be at the level of E** hours of work. As was
explained before, at this post-adjustment point the individual net gain is
represented by the vertical distance, BE, between the two black stars in Chart
6b.
Kaplow and Shavell argue that they can construct a modified tax
schedule that will give incentives to the potential tortfeasor to continue
choosing E** as her optimal work-leisure decision, and, in addition, that this
increased income tax will happen to leave her as well off as before. Put
differently, Kaplow and Shavell claim they can design point E '* from Chart
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6a above to fall exactly at E** at Chart 6b above. Line l ' (e) represents the
individual's total income: the sum of her money income and psychic
(leisure) income, under the new modified income tax. Recall that in the
income-independent world, the potential tortfeasor makes her precaution
decisions independently of her work-leisure decisions. Thus, in that world,
she will choose C*4 as her optimal accident related costs. Under Kaplow and
Shavell's modified income tax, the individual net gain is equal to CF. It is the
vertical distance between the new net income I' ( e) and the socially optimal
accident costs C*4.
Kaplow and Shavell claim that they can construct a new income tax that
"leaves individuals with the same income as in the initial regime" while still
providing them with incentives so that their "work effort is unaffected by the
48
new regime." Put differently, Kaplow and Shavell claim they can design an
income tax that can do two things. First, it will leave the potential tortfeasor
indifferent because CF ( her net gain under Kaplow and Shavell's modified
income tax regime) is equal to BE (her net gain in the income-dependent
tort regime) . Second, it will provide the potential tortfeasor with incentives
to chose E** as her privately optimal work effort. Line I' (e) represents both
parts of their claim in that its maximizing point is exactly at E**, while CF is
equal to BE.
Is such a tax regime "simple" to construct? Part of the answer would be
that it is hard because the tax-and-transfer system would need i nformation
that only the courts may hold. The other part of the answer would be that, i n
fact, it i s impossible since the tax-and-transfer system will need information
that only the individual, at best, privately possesses (and has no reason to
reveal) .
To see this point, observe that the authorities i n Kaplow and Shavell's
modified tax schedule must first know the potential tortfeasor's net work
income function W(e) and her psychic income function L(e) . These two
properties are needed to know the tortfeasor's total net income function,
l (e) . Without knowing l (e) , it is impossible to design an equivalent income
tax schedule. However, one may argue that these properties are relatively
accessible because, presumably, the tax authorities already possess this
information-it is the same type of information they need to optimally
construct the current income tax regime. The next two properties that the
tax authorities need to know are the tortfeasor's precaution function, P (x) ,
and the expected harm the individuals face. This information is needed for
two purposes: first, to be able to construct for each potential tortfeasor her
C* (e) function, and second, in order to pinpoint C*4. Without knowing
these two properties, it would be impossible to design an income tax regime
that will leave the potential tortfeasor indifferent. Unfortunately, these two
properties are observable, if at all, only by the courts. More probable,

48.

Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 673.
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however, is that under a strict liability regime, which is the regime that both
we and Kaplow and Shavell assume, even the courts do not have this
49
information.
It is important to recognize that it is not enough to know the general
shape or curvature of the functions. The tax authorities will need to know
the exact materialization of this function for every individual (if
heterogeneity is introduced) in order to be able to design an individually
5°
tailored tax that will leave the inj urers indifferent. Clearly, there is no tax
authority in the world that possesses or that can acquire enough information
for every single individual. We thus reject the claim that this modified tax
regime (especially if heterogeneity is introduced) is "simple. " Rather, we
51
think it is impossible.
III.

RESPONSE TO O BJECTIONS

In this Part we respond to some possible objections to our arguments in
this Article. First, it could be argued that if courts have the information
needed to implement an income-dependent tax regime, they could just
share the information with the taxing authority, which could then design the
tailored Pareto superior tax rule. If that turns out to be possible (at relatively
low cost) , such a result would be consistent with our overall framework. In
such a case, the court would be the better "proxy observer" with respect to
49. See generally Logue & Avraham, supra note 10. To be sure, it is impossible to observe an
individual' s "precaution function." Even the individual herself will not have this information. As
a result, just as we use income as a proxy for ability, we must find proxies for the precaution
function. The two best proxies are care taken and harm caused. Thus, one could suggest that
the courts, under a negligence regime, might gather information regarding an indiyi.dual's
precaution taken and harm caused and then provide that information to the taxing authority.
At that point, the taxing authority would make the distribution decision. Sharing information in
this way, however, would be costly. Moreover, it raises difficult issues of institutional
comparative advantage.
In any event, the tort regime assumed in Kaplow and Shavell's analysis is one of strict
liability, a regime under which courts make no effort to observe the level of precautions taken,
for there is no due care standard against which to measure them. Thus, under Kaplow and
Shavell's assumptions, there is no government actor that is well situated to gather information
about the precaution function and expected harm presented by individuals. However,
according to Kaplow and Shavell's modified tax regime, there is, nevertheless, a need to know
both the precaution function and the expected harm of each individual. One response to this
critique might be to argue that under a strict liability regime, courts will not have the relevant
information either; hence, an income-dependent strict liability rule will not be any better at
solving this problem. To understand how courts can apply a redistributive scheme under an
income-dependent strict liability regime, see infra text following note 55.
50. For a list of the types of information needed by the tax authorities under Kaplow and
Shavell's framework, see Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 678
equation A3.
5 1 . Recall that our model is simpler than Kaplow and Shavell's in that we assume that
individuals are either injurers or victims. If we adopt the more realistic assumption that
individuals can be both injurers and victims, as Kaplow and Shavell did, the information burden
is further exacerbated.
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accident-proneness, and the tax system would be the better redistributor
52
However, there will presumably be some cost

with respect to that proxy.

associated with the transfer of this information from the court to the
legislature. In any event, we do not argue that the legal system has a
comparative advantage over the tax system in redistributing income. Rather,
it is Kaplow and Shavell who argue that for any income-redistributive legal
rule, a tax-and-transfer alternative can always be designed that is Pareto

superior. That is the core point of their model. But in practical terms, such a
regime cannot be implemented because of the informational burden we
53
discussed above.

A related critique might be that for the policymaker to hit the target
amount of redistribution using a tort tax she would have to know in advance
,

all the information we cite (such responses as taking additional care or
working less, etc.) to set the tort tax correctly. If the policymaker has that
information, however, so the critique goes, she also would be able to achieve
the same redistribution through the tax system, and in a more efficient
manner. This argument has problems, too. Recall that the policymaker has
information regarding the general distributions of ability to generate income
and skill in taking care (accident-proneness) in society. Based on this limited
information the policymaker can design a two-dimensional tax schedule that
determines the overall tax (income tax and tort tax) each citizen needs to
pay, based on income and tort activity. The policymaker can safely assume
that on average, she is promoting equality of welfare compared to the world
of income tax only. Indeed, this complex tax schedule is meant to achieve a
more egalitarian society (in the sense of equality of welfare, not of income
only) by taking into account not only income (either as a proxy for
individuals' ability to generate income, which in turn is a proxy for their
overall well-being, or as a direct proxy for the overall well-being) , but also
their care level and harm caused (as a proxy for their accident-proneness
their precaution function-which in turn is, again, a proxy for their overall
well-being) .

52.

Logue & Avraham,

53.

One might object to our impossible-informational-burden argument by claiming that

supra note 10,

at 1 77.

the tax-and-transfer system could simply mimic the consequences of an income-dependent legal
regime. Thus, the argument goes, if an income-dependent legal regime caused a person to pay
an extra $10,000 a year in the form of a tort tax, then the alternative income-independent tax
regime could simply add $ 10,000 to the person 's tax liability and restore the efficient tort rule.
This objection, however, is flawed. If it means that the taxing authority can mimic the
consequences of a tort tax even before it is imposed, the objection commits the same mistake
that we identified above. That is, the objection overlooks the fact that there is no way the taxing
authority could anticipate individual hypothetical ex ante adjustments to the tort tax and then
mimic it. If, on the other hand, the objection means that the taxing authority could look at
historical data and see how individuals made their adjustments

to

the tort tax, and then mimic

it, the objection still would be flawed. Even if it were possible for the taxing authority to use
historical data in this way, which is doubtful, such an approach could work only if an income
dependent legal regime first had been in place for some time.
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Let us assume that both the IRS officials and the court system receive
this complex tax schedule. Starting with the court system, a judge could, at
relatively low cost, acquire the information about an individual 's income
from the IRS and would be able to observe individual harm caused and care
level investments, which, as has been shown, are relevant to the overall
54
welfare analysis. Switching to Kaplow and Shavell 's alternative tax rule,
recall that in order to design an alternative Pareto-superior modified tax
regime (a regime that leaves nobody worse off) , the IRS must know
individuals' accident-proneness. However, even if we assume that taxpayers
will report this information honestly, under Kaplow and Shavell 's regime,
the individual taxpayers would not be able to fill out their 1040 forms with
all of the relevant information, for they do not know their own accident
proneness. Thus, whereas it is enough for the social planner to know the
general distributions of skills in society in order to design an income
dependent tort rule, the IRS would need to know the accident-proneness of
55
each individual to implement a Pareto-superior alternative tax rule.
The above critique can now be restated: just as judges can implement
the complex tax schedule by using reports about individual income (a proxy
for ability) , so too could the IRS, with less cost, implement the same tax
schedule by using reports about individual investments in care and harm
caused (proxies for accident proneness) . First, observe that such an
objection no longer claims that redistributing through the IRS is Pareto
superior, but rather that it is less costly. Second, a problem with such a regime
is that individual taxpayers would have an incentive not to reveal their care
level investments, given that they know it to be unobservable to the IRS.
That is, they would have an incentive to behave strategically. A response to
this argument might be that the court could share this information with the
IRS. But doing so would be costly-much more costly than for the courts to
share data about individual income with the IRS. And, if the tort rule were
one of strict liability, even the courts would not have the care-level
information to share; instead, the information would be taken into account
implicitly, as the rule would apply disproportionately for those classes of
individuals who tend to be accident prone. This is an assumption that both
Sanchirico and Kaplow and Shavell make in their analyses.
Still, one might argue that the double-distortion argument continues to
have some intuitive appeal. After all, there is more pie to slice if we use legal
rules only to achieve efficiency. That intuition does hold true, but only
under a very restrictive assumption; that is, only if the better off group (in

54.

W e are aware that the analysis here assumes a regime o f negligence and no t of strict

liability. As the discussion
liability.

55.

infra shows, the
See infra text following note 55.

same logic applies when the regime is one of strict

Again, our arguments here, as in the rest of the Article, do not suggest that income

dependent tort rules are superior to income-independent ones. Rather, our argument is merely
that an income-independent regime is not necessarily always Pareto superior.
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terms of their total welfare) , from whom we want to transfer resources, also
consists entirely of the income rich (as identified by the IRS ) . That assumption
would hold in two cases: first, if all the rich (at any given level of income)
were defendants facing the same lawsuits (and thus subject to the same tort
tax)-in this situation, we basically restore the homogeneity assumption we
relaxed in this Article-and second, if individuals' incomes were the
ultimate end (rather than their well-being or welfare) . Indeed, in that case
Kaplow and Shavell's double-distortion argument would have been correct
and relevant for policy-making. If all that we cared about was reducing
income gaps in society, there would be no economic reason to use tort law,
for example, to tax the defendants because the IRS could tax the rich with
less overall distortion. The problem with this second case, of course, is that
hardly any theorist, and definitely not Kaplow and Shavell, treats income
56
inequality as the ultimate end of redistributive policy.
Put differently, the problem with the intuition of the double-distortion
argument is that it ends up running afoul of one or the other of the
following two facts: first, that equality of welfare and not equality of income
is the social goal; and second, that in an environment of incomplete
information, redistributive legal rules can contribute to the social goal of
better equalizing welfare precisely because people with different inner, and
unobservable, characteristics (albeit with the same income) react differently
to redistributive legal rules. Redistributive legal rules allow the policymaker
to distinguish between people with the same income yet different total
welfare. The policymaker can do this by exploiting the fact that people with
the same income interact differently with the same legal rules. This different
reaction (what we called the ex ante adjustments that people make in
response to legal rules) is a signal the policymaker can use to better achieve
57
equality of welfare.

56. The Appendix in Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, which deals
with individuals' utility functions, makes clear that what Kaplow and Shavell are after is welfare
and not income. Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell are major advocates of the welfarist approach. See
generally Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 8. For the purpose of this Article
we, too, adopt the welfarist approach, which is mainly characterized by the fact that its ultimate
end is the general welfare, and thus treats income only as one proxy for that end.
57. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 10 (taking such an approach ) . Some readers who are
familiar with the sub-literature of optimal taxation in the literature on public finance may
wonder why we obtained different results from the 1971 celebrated "production efficiency"
result of Diamond and Mirrlees and the 1976 "uniform commodity taxation" result of Atkinson
and Stiglitz. In Optimal Taxation and Public Production, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 261 ( 1 971 ) , Diamond
and Mirrlees basically showed (stated loosely here) that the economy should be on its
production frontier at the optimum even when the government cannot impose a perfectly
tailored lump sum tax but can impose a (linear) tax on all factors at different rates. In The
Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55 ( 1 976) , Atkinson and
Stiglitz showed (again, stated loosely here) that when the government can use a non-linear
( namely, a progressive) income tax, there is no need to use commodity taxation. Taken
together, these results imply that the government should not use indirect tax instruments such
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CONCLUSION

This Article contends that, while Kaplow and Shavell's argument that
the tax-and-transfer system is always better than legal rules in redistributing
income is theoretically sound, given their assumptions, their observation
should not serve as a policy-making aid. Specifically, we argue that Kaplow
and Shavell's Pareto-efficiency conclusion must change once some of their
simplifying assumptions are relaxed. Kaplow and Shavell argue that they can
design a "simple " alternative tax regime (while maintaining an income
independent legal regime) that is Pareto superior to any income-dependent
(or income-redistributive) legal regime. Such a regime would be Pareto
superior because it would suffer from a single distortion rather than two
distortions, as the income-dependent legal regime does. Under their
income-independent legal regime, the argument goes, there is only the
work-leisure distortion , whereas under the income-dependent legal regime,
there is not only the same work-leisure distortion but also a regulated-activity
distortion.
The first part of our critique of this Pareto-efficiency story involves the
double-distortion argument. To the extent Kaplow and Shavell have in mind
designing a general (non-tailored) alternative tax regime, their Pareto
superior argument fails to take into account the full consequences of the fact
that, under the income-dependent legal regime, individuals would take
advantage of the two degrees of freedom they have under the income-dependent
regime. That is, individuals would adjust both their work effort and their
regulated activity. Thus, we argue that it is impossible to know, a priori, the
exact amount of work effort and of care level investments, which, therefore,
poses an informational burden on the ability of the policy maker to design a
58
Pareto superior rule. Moreover, once heterogeneity is introduced, Kaplow
and Shavell's Pareto superior argument fails to take into account the fact that
as differentiated commodity taxation and that redistribution should be achieved solely with a
direct (non-linear) income tax. Indeed, as Kaplow and Shavell have observed, redistributive
legal rules could be seen as (or at least compared with) differentiated commodity taxation so
the Diamond and Mirrlees and the Atkinson and Stiglitz results would presumably (maintaining
their other assumptions, such as that utility functions are separable between goods, legal rules,
and leisure) continue to apply to the context of legal rules. Our work here should be seen in
light of other recent work in the optimal taxation literature that shows that once the
assumption of complete information is relaxed, the above results no longer hold. For example,
Stiglitz himself showed that when the assumptions that the government
people's skills, and

(2)

Mirrlees model, are relaxed and

(3)

can observe

needs, rather, to base taxation on income only-the

production efficiency result breaks down. Joseph E. Stiglitz,

Taxation, 1 7 ].

(1)

can impose differentiated tax rates on each type as in the Diamond and

PUB. ECON.

2 1 3, 2 1 3-40 ( 1982 ) .

Self Selection and Pareto Efficient

Recently, Naito has shown that both the uniform

commodity taxation result and the production efficiency result break down if, among other
things, the government has incomplete information vis-a-vis people's skills. Hisahiro Naito, Re

examination of Uniform Commodity Taxes Under a Non-linear Income Tax System and Its Implication for
Production Efficiency, J. PUB. ECON. 71 ( 1999) 165, 1 73-81 ( 1999) .
58. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21 .
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different individuals would make different ex ante adjustments to maximize
their total net income, making any simple alternative tax regime no longer
Pareto improving.
Second, to the extent that Kaplow and Shavell have in mind a tailored
alternative tax regime, their Pareto superior argument is correct in theory but
is no longer simple to implement. The reason is that, in order to execute the
tailored alternative tax regime, the informational burden on the taxing
authority would be considerable. Under such an alternative regime,
however, the taxing authority would need to have detailed information
about each taxpayer, information such as the individual's innate accident
proneness, her investments in accident avoidance ("care levels" ) , the harm
she has caused, and so on-information that tax authorities do not usually
59
have. In contrast, under the income-dependent legal regime, courts do
possess most, if not all, of this required information. As a result, for a court
to add the redistributive component to its tort rulings, it would only need
further information about individual income, information that is relatively
accessible.
Again, we do not therefore argue that income redistribution should
generally be done through the legal system. In fact, we hold the view that
the tax system is generally better suited for that task. However, we believe so
for the old (pre-Kaplow and Shavell) reasons-that is, because of the
contracting-around problem and haphazardness problem mentioned in the
introduction. Our point here is that Kaplow and Shavell's Pareto superior
argument, despite being theoretically correct, adds little of policy
importance to the redistributive rules debate because it is virtually
60
impossible to implement. To use a somewhat fanciful (but we think

59. It seems that Shaven was aware of this problem. In his 1981 paper, he admits that "if
the income tax would not be altered on adoption of new liability rules, then in strict logic the
argument given for use of efficient rules does not apply." Shavell, supra note 1 2, at 41 7. Shavell
emphasizes the fact that such a world would be "impractical" because "no one would really
expect the income tax structure to be adjusted in response to each and every change in legal
rules." Id. Shavell seems to refer to adminstrative impediments; his prescription to this
"impractical" world is to consider alterations of the income tax whenever the changes in the
legal rules resulted in a "sufficiently important" shift in the distribution of income. Id. Our
point is that even when changes in legal rules result in a "sufficiently important" shift in the
distribution of income, the social planner still would not have enough information to alter the
income tax in a Pareto superior way. As explained before, the impediments to applying a Pareto
superior legal rule that we have addressed in this Article, are informational and not
adminstrative. For a demonstration of this problem, see supra note 53 and accompanying text.

60. Somewhat ironically, Kaplow and Shavell make a similar criticism of Sanchirico's
paper, arguing that:
Although one or another qualification may turn out to be relevant in some
instances, we would need to have sufficient evidence (or, at minimum, plausible
empirical conjectures) in order to know what, if any adjustments to legal rules
should be made. Yet, as we have explained, the relevant information does not seem
likely to be forthcoming.
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revealing) analogy, whereas it is theoretically possible to approach the speed
of light, the practical difficulties involved in actually implementing this
theoretical possibility prohibits the creation of super high-speed spacecraft.
No one argues that we should stop building slow yet practical spacecraft
because for every such spaceship, there is an alternative, albeit purely
theoretical, design that would travel faster.
The upshot of our argument is that with respect to the debate over
income-redistributive legal rules, the focus should be on institutional
comparative advantage (legal rules vs. the IRS) while taking into account the
informational burden needed to make proper redistribution. The focus
should also be on the haphazardness and contracting-around problems and
whether, despite those problems, there may be some potential
supplementary income-redistributive role for legal rules. In a previous article
61
two of us analyzed this question in more detail.

Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 1 2, at 835. We agree and think
that the same critique applies to their reditributive scheme, for whatever information is needed
to pre-plan the adjustments to legal rules is also needed to design the alternative Paret<rsuperior
tax regime, and more.
61.

See generally Logue & Avraham, supra note 10.
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APPENDIX

This Part addresses the transformations needed to see how the accident
cost-minimizing decision will interact with the work-leisure decision. To that
end we need to superimpose Chart 3 total-accident-cost minimizing points,
C*, onto the graph of the work-leisure tradeoff shown in Chart 2a above.
Unfortunately, these two graphs (the total-accident-cost minimizing
decision, C*, and the work-leisure decision) have different variables on their
X-axes: harm faced by injurer (in dollars) and work effort (in hours) ,
respectively. We now show the transformation needed in order to present
the total-accident-cost minimizing graph, C*, (from Chart 3) on the same X
axis (effort in hours) as the work-leisure tradeoff (from Chart 2 ) .
Recall that Chart 3 depicts the total-accident-cost minimizing points (in
dollars) as a function of the harm faced by injurer. For our transformation
we need to make a few assumptions. However, these assumptions build on
the following intuition: while damages under the income-independent
regime are contingent only on harm to a third party (as represented by
curves HO through HS in Chart 2b) , damages under the income-dependent
tort regime are a function of the injurer's income as well. Beginning with
that intuition, the first transformation assumes that the relationship between
the two functions-the damages under the income-dependent tort regime
and the after-tax money income function-is linear; in other words, we
assume that the "tort tax" under the income-dependent tort regime is linear
62
in after-tax income. As a result, one would expect to see the same curvature
as the one in Chart 3 for a graph that depicts the relationship between the
total-accident-cost minimizing graph, C*, and the injurer's income (upon
which the damages under the income-dependent tort regime are now
dependent) . Chart 4a presents the relationship between the total-accident
cost minimizing graph, C*, and the injurer's after-tax income.

62. Kaplow and Shaven make the same assumption. Kaplow & Shavell, Efficiency in
Redistribution, supra note 6, at 669-70. They also assume linearity in their formal appendix. Id. at
677.
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Chart 4a: The Total-Accident-Cost Minimizing Points, C*, as a
Function of After-Tax Income
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Chart 4a demonstrates, indeed, the same cmvature as in Chart 3, which
depicted the total-accident-cost minimizing points (in dollars) as a function
of the harm faced by the injurer. However, there is one major difference:
the relevant range for which the graph is depicted. Chart 3 depicted the
optimal costs, C*, for the whole range of possible harms. For the first
transformation we need to depict the optimal costs, C*, as a function of the
harm, but only for a smaller range. Specifically, we are interested in
depicting the graph when the amount of damages is comprised of not only
the harm, but also of, for example, a 1% tort tax on the difference between
the tortfeasor's income and some arbitrary cutoff income. Thus, we depicted
only a segment from the original concave graph-a segment around the
optimal level of damages, H4, which corresponds to an after-income-tax
income of $30,000.
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To better see this point, it is instructive to recall that we chose a "tort

tax that is equal to 1 % of the difference between the tortfeasor's income
"

and some arbitrary cutoff income of $30,000. Thus, Chart 4a depicts
changes ranging from a negative tort tax of $300 (to those who earn $0) to a
positive tort tax of $700 (from those who earn $100,000) . Kaplow and
Shavell did roughly the same thing when they attempted to demonstrate the
consequences of collecting and redistributing 1 .5% of the difference
between individual income and a cutoff income of $33,333, also in the range
63
of incomes $0 to $ 1 00,000.
For the second transformation, assume that the relationship between
64

the after-tax money income and the number of work hours is also linear.

The result is that we can now assume that the relationship between the total
accident-cost minimizing points,

C*,

as a function

of the potential
65
Chart 4b

tortfeasor's work effort, continues to be a concave function.
presents this relationship.

63. Kaplow & Shaven, Efficiency in Redistribution, supra note 6, at 669-71 . The choice of
numbers is arbitrary and does not influence the qualitative results of our paper. See also supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
64.

Again, Kaplow and Shaven make the same assumption. See Kaplow & Shaven , Should

Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 12, at 822.
65. The reason this can be said is that if the total-optimal-accident-cost curve, C*, is a
concave function of the level of damages, and the level of damages under the income
dependent tort regime in turn is a linear function of income, and income in turn is a linear
function of work effort, then it must be that the optimal accident cost curve, C*, is a concave
function of the level of work effort. Note that Chart 4b is depicted for a person who earns
$1 00,000 while working 24 hours a day. If a person earned only $50,000 for the same hours,
Chart 4b is different. Just as Chart l a is for a specific person, so is Chart 4b. This does not
change any qualitative result in our analysis.
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In essence, Chart 4b demonstrates that the potential injurer's work
leisure decisions ( how many hours to work) influence not only her after-tax
income but also her total (privately optimal) accident costs, C*.

